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The newly formed Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO) began collecting data on fisheries
in the early 1950s. At this time, the indus-
try faced a period of extremely rapid expansion.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the growth of
yields far exceeded human population growth
while fisheries remained largely intact. Over
this period, yields rose continuously, and fish-
eries were seemingly in endless abundance, lead-
ing a generation of regulators to believe in the
sustainability of global fishery resources (Pauly
et al., 2002).
However this belief was found to be false some
years later. The first known collapse of a fish-
ery was the case of the Peruvian anchoveta in
1971 (Clark, 1977). Initially this was blamed
on an El Niño event, however further investiga-
tions revealed that extensive overfishing was the
most likely cause. With growth in global yields
continuing unabated, the stocks of fisheries the
world over began to show signs of weakness in
the late 1980s, which has continued to this day
(FAO, 2012).
Today, most scientists agree that the global
fisheries industry is facing a crisis (Myers and
Worm, 2003, Montaigne, 2007, Yumiko, 2004).
More than half the world’s fisheries are at, or
above, their maximum sustainable limits with no
further room for expansion (FAO, 2012). Worm
et al. (2006) estimate that one third of sea fish-
eries have collapsed, with the rate of decline ac-
celerating. They further go on to predict that
this will be the last century of wild seafood.
According to Clark (2006), the worldwide ma-
rine fisheries crisis can be succinctly explained as
a problem of “too many boats chasing too few
fish.” Although these fishing fleets can target
new fisheries should current fisheries become less
productive, the primary issue is that the oceans
natural resources are finite.
A noticeable trend in the general decline of
global fisheries is that large and valuable species
of fish have been most affected (Myers and
Worm, 2003).
In this research we highlight just one of those
fisheries - the West Coast rock lobster fishery in
South Africa. The analysis that follows starts
by looking at the history of the fishery and finds
that the productivity of the resource has experi-
enced a precipitous decline in the last 50 years.
Within this period, the 1980s stands in stark
contrast, having displayed noteworthy stability.
In light of this, the second part of this paper
moves into a detailed exploration of the 1980s,
where we assess the strategic interaction between
stakeholders in an attempt to understand the
dynamics at work. Within this section we ex-
plore various methods of analysing the indus-
try, choosing the game theoretic approach intro-
duced by Ostrom et al. (1994). Using this ap-
proach we determine why the 1980s period was
so stable, and how the dynamics in the fishery
have changed since then. In the third section of
this research we review these findings to assess
the options open to policymakers and in doing
so we detail two interesting case studies of best
practice in fisheries in other countries. Finally,
we use the analyses conducted and the case stud-
ies presented to determine four policy implica-
tions that would aid policymakers going forward.
2 The history of the West
Coast rock lobster fishery in
South Africa
We now contextualise the history of the West
Coast rock lobster fishery in South Africa in two
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parts. In the following section we offer a history
of the fishery dating back to the very first records
of harvesting, right up to the beginning of the
1980s. The next section assesses at a micro level
the fishery in the 1980s, drawing from first-hand
discussions with various individuals involved in
the 1980s as well as today, fishing industry hand-
books published during in the last three decades,
and also minutes of meetings held by specific in-
dustry groups in the past 40 years.
2.1 The history of the fishery prior to
1980
The West Coast rock lobster Jasus lalandii has a
long history of exploitation in Southern Africa;
it is thought to have been a component of the
diet of indigenous inhabitants in the region as far
back as the Holocene era, approximately 10,000
years ago (Buchanan, 1988). More recently, in
the 19th and 20th centuries, the resource was a
sought after food and bait, used particularly by
the poorer classes living along the West Coast.
In the mid-1800s the rock lobster “was easily
caught in vast numbers all the year round” and
“to the poor classes of the community, and to
misers, this crawfish was a regular godsend”
(Pappe, 1853, as quoted by Melville-Smith and
Van Sittert, 2005). Astonishingly, in the 19th
century the lobster was confirmed as a “food for
the poor” and was shunned by the middle-class
of the Cape. Today the rock lobster is consid-
ered a delicacy and can easily cost restaurateurs
R600/kg depending on the time of the year.
In Southern Africa, the West Coast rock lob-
ster is indigenous between 23◦S, north of Walvis
Bay in Namibia, and 28◦S, near East London
in South Africa. As shown in figure 1 however,
commercial densities are only encountered along
the West Coast from 25◦S to slightly east of the
Cape of Good Hope (Buchanan, 1988).
Figure 1: Commercial fishing areas for various
lobster types along the coast of Southern Africa
Source: Cockcroft and Payne (1999).
Commercial exploitation began in 1875 with
the establishment of a processing plant in Cape
Town to can and export lobsters to Europe,
where it was seen as a cheap substitute for north-
ern hemisphere lobsters. By 1914 the indus-
try had expanded to include a handful of fac-
tories as far up the West Coast as Lüderitz
in Namibia. European demand for the lobster
increased steadily over this period, while mer-
chants began to freeze lobster tails for export to
a growing market in the United States (Thomp-
son, 1913). Immediately after the Second World
War production facilities were re-organized and
refinanced by the government in an effort to
encourage employment and output growth. In
terms of this arrangement public funds were pro-
vided to private companies for post-war mod-
ernization (Daniels, 2007). Subsequently, the
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rock lobster catch began to expand consider-
ably, reaching a peak in the 1950s at around
16,000 tons per annum. More recently however,
the fishery has displayed a protracted downward
trend in yield, right up to the present day (figure
2).
Figure 2: Landings of West Coast rock lobster
in South Africa between 1891 and 2001
Note: Data presented are derived from exports
of canned, frozen, raw and live lobster which
are converted into estimated whole live landed
weight.
Source: Melville-Smith and Van Sittert (2005).
Catches are now a mere fraction of what they
once were at around 2,200 tons per annum, how-
ever the resource still plays a vital role in many,
mainly impoverished areas, and is still the third
most valuable fishery in terms of landed value in
South Africa (Johnston and Butterworth, 2005).
Three potential sources of the decline were
technological in nature. First, hoopnets were
once the most common method of catching lob-
ster, however traps became increasingly more
common during the 1960s, having severe con-
sequences for the sustainability of the resource
(Schoeman et al., 2002). Second, not only were
traps more efficient, but they were also laid by
large vessels, which replaced the small dinghies
operating without winches or even motors at
times. These new vessels had access to pre-
viously unfished deeper waters farther off the
coast than where hoopnets had traditionally
been used. Third, before deck grid-sorters were
introduced onto boats in the mid-1970s there was
a high discard mortality of undersized animals,
which impacted the sub-legal sized portion of
the stock and therefore ultimately future stocks
of harvestable lobsters (Schoeman, 2002; Crous,
1976).
In response to declining yields a number of
management measures have been introduced to
control the exploitation of the resource. Figure
3 summarizes the variety of measures instituted
over time and maps them to historical yields.
The first intervention was introduced in 1933
in terms of which lobster with a carapace length
(CL) of less than 89mm were prohibited from
being harvested (figure 4).
Importantly, the number of eggs a particular
female can produce (the fecundity) is directly de-
pendent on the size of the lobster: larger females
produce more eggs per unit of size than smaller
females.1 Large females are capable of produc-
ing in excess of a million eggs, with almost all
being successfully fertilized (Caputi et al., 2008).
This is demonstrated in figure 5 with Panulirus
cygnus, a rock lobster indigenous to the West
1Chubb (1991) suggests that the fecundity of female
West Coast rock lobster is equal to 1.92 x (carapace
length)2.69
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Figure 3: History of West Coast rock lobster yields and resource management interventions in
South Africa
Source: Author’s estimates, Melville-Smith and Van Sittert (2005), Cockcroft and Payne (1999).
Coast of Australia. This relationship has obvi-
ous implications in terms of the carapace length
restriction and how able the resource is to re-
plenish itself.
Despite the importance of size on female fe-
cundity and the introduction of size restrictions,
catches declined precipitously between 1950 and
1970. It is hypothesized that this is most likely
due to overfishing, especially in the northern re-
gions where virtually uncontrolled exploitation
took place after 1959 (Cockcroft and Payne,
1999, Mather et al., 2003). According to those
familiar with the matter, the fishing grounds in
the north were once extremely productive and
thought to be practically inexhaustible (Peter
Foley, Chief Executive, West Coast Rock Lob-
ster Association, personal communication, May
20, 2011). For example, off the coast of Port
Nolloth a very small area roughly the size of
only 6 rugby fields would yield 300 tons of rock
lobster a year. Over time however, the north-
ern grounds became less productive, and fishers
moved southwards towards Lambert’s Bay. Fig-
ure 6 maps the traditional fishing grounds, now
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Figure 4: Morphology of the Jasus lalandii indi-
cating the measurement of the carapace length
Source: Department of Primary Industries
(2010).
officially demarcated into zones. While the most
northern zone was once the most fertile, by the
1990/91 season about 95% of the resource was
harvested in zones B, C and D. More recently,
in the 1999/00 fishing season, zone D dominated
yields with 85% of the commercial catch, com-
pared to 48% ten years earlier (Cockcroft et al.,
2000, Mather et al., 2003).
As the annual catch began to wane in the post-
1950 period and fishers began to migrate south-
wards, other measures were instituted to protect
the resource. While the carapace length restric-
tion discussed above was likely the most impor-
tant restriction, other measures also impacted
the stock of the resource. These included tail-
mass production quotas (which eventually be-
came whole-mass quotas), daily bag limits for
recreational fishers, closed seasons, restrictions
of mesh aperture and a prohibition on the pos-
session of berried females (figure 3).
The history of the fishery reveals that the reg-
ulatory environment prior to 1980 was reactive
in the sense that decisive actions were taken only
after the resource had suffered a severe amount
Figure 5: Fecundity of the Western rock lobster
Panulirus cygnus compared to carapace length
Source: Caputi et al. (2008).
of overexploitation (figure 3). Between 1950 and
1980 regulations to curtail exploitation seemed
to lag the exploitation itself - this is particularly
the case in the northern fishing grounds as ev-
idenced by the declining productivity of the re-
source in those areas.
Within the history of the fishery, the 1980s
stand markedly against a fishery in decline. Fig-
ure 3 reveals that this decade is the only pe-
riod in the long history of the resource in which
yields were stable for any prolonged period of
time. Given this, it becomes valuable to assess
at a micro level the dynamics which lead to this
outcome.
2.2 A stylized description of the 1980s
After the long downward trend experienced in
lobster yields between 1950 and 1980, yields be-
gan to stabilize. During the 1980s scientists con-
sidered the resource to be sustainably providing
annual harvests of between 3,500 and 4,000 tons
(Johnston and Butterworth, 2005). In this sec-
tion we provide a stylized description of the in-
dustry during this period in order to better un-
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Figure 6: West Coast rock lobster fishing
grounds
Source: Cockcroft and Mackenzie (1997).
derstand how this outcome occurred.
During the 1980s an interesting industry
structure was present as only two firms were per-
mitted to engage in the process of marketing rock
lobster, both on a local and an international ba-
sis: South African Frozen Rock Lobster Packers
(SAFROC) and Cape Lobster Exporters Associ-
ation (CLEA) (Mather et al., 2003).
The structure of this value chain dates back
to the 1940s when the Crawfish Export Control
Act2 was first promulgated. Prior to this, ex-
ports (mainly to the United States of America)
were entirely unregulated and hence any indi-
vidual could export any quality of rock lobster
overseas. When the New York Food and Drug
Administration warned that imports of rock lob-
ster would be banned if the quality did not im-
2Act 9 of 1940. Later renamed the Rock Lobster Ex-
port Control Act.
prove, the South African Government enacted
regulations to curb the export of poor quality
rock lobster tails. In terms of this Act, SAFROC
was deemed to be the central marketing agency
for rock lobster (Du Plessis et al., 1971, van Sit-
tert, 2002).
At this stage SAFROC exported rock lobster
in either canned or frozen tail form. In the mid-
1960s however, a group of lobster quota-holders
realised that the produce could be more valuable
if it were shipped in whole, live form. They ap-
proached SAFROC to facilitate the sale of live
lobster in the United States of America, however
they declined since they had no interest or exper-
tise in handling or marketing live lobster. Fol-
lowing this, the group of quota-holders lobbied
the Government to allow them to sell whole live
lobster without the help of SAFROC. The Gov-
ernment acquiesced on condition that they cre-
ated one association through which the lobster
would be marketed, instead of having multiple
live lobster marketers (Jeff Louw, CLEA found-
ing member, personal communication, July 13,
2011). In December of 1964 the Cape Lobster
Exporters Association was formed in accordance
with the Government’s wishes (CLEA, 2011).
Neither SAFROC nor CLEA would hold any
rights to fish or access the resource themselves.
Rather, members of these organisations held
quotas in their own name, with the organisa-
tions acting as conduits for the marketing, sale
and distribution locally and internationally. Af-
ter processing the lobster, quota holders would
transfer them to SAFROC or CLEA for onward
sale and distribution. Members would then re-
ceive a share of the profits in direct proportion
to the amount of lobster transferred annually.
Open and honest accounting methods garnered a
high degree of trust, with members being able to
consult directly with SAFROC and CLEA board
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members on issues that concerned them.
Figure 7: West Coast rock lobster value chain in
the 1980s
Source: Author’s construction.
Access to the resource was granted by the
State in the form of quota allocations, mainly
to a limited number of white-owned companies
by the so-called Quota Board (Cochrane and
Payne, 1999). While there were no regulations
to prevent any population group becoming en-
trepreneurs in the fishing industry, there is some
evidence to conclude that certain population
groups were discriminated against in terms of
attracting quotas (Daniels, 2007, Diemont et al.,
1986). For example, only 0,75 percent of the To-
tal Allowable Catch (TAC) in 1994 was awarded
to black-owned-companies (Nielsen and Hara,
2006).
In terms of the institutions of the day, the Min-
ister, with advice from scientists, would set the
TAC each season, but had no control over the
process by which quotas were allocated. Quotas
were issued for a period of one year and were re-
allocated at the beginning of each season accord-
ing to a set of guidelines. At the beginning of the
1980/81 season, quotas were issued to exactly
40 companies (South African Fishery Yearbook,
1981). According to those familiar with the mat-
ter, these were roughly the same 40 companies
that received quotas in the previous few seasons,
and roughly the same 40 companies that contin-
ued to receive quotas for the rest of the decade.
In other words, although the quotas were de jure
short term allocations, they were de facto long
term allocations (Johan Steyn, rock lobster fac-
tory manager, personal communication, June 22,
2011).
The Quota Board also enjoyed a quantum of
independence in terms of rights allocations. This
fact, coupled with the lack of monitoring and ac-
countability in this process may have led to a de-
gree of corruption, collusion, or discrimination.
Suffice it to say that there were certainly many
accusations of unfair conduct on the behalf of
the Quota Board, despite the purported use of
approved guidelines in determining allocations
(Mayekiso, Tilney and Swardt, 2000).
As we can see there existed an interesting
set of circumstances in the 1980s that deserve
further attention. First, the value chain is ex-
tremely concentrated. Second, the Quota Board
was given the ability to allocate quotas without
much interference from the Minister, allowing
the issuance of de facto long term fishing rights
to a select group of fishers. These and other
important issues are explored in more rigorous
detail in the following section.
3 A game theoretic analysis of
the 1980s
We now present an analysis of the fishery in an
attempt to understand what led to the stability
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of the resource during the 1980s. We choose a
game theoretic analysis of the fishery because the
situation is fundamentally a strategic interaction
between groups of individuals, and therefore is
well-placed to assist our analysis.
Game theory is a tool for explaining and
analysing the strategic interaction between eco-
nomic agents. It uses mathematics to describe
player strategies in sources of conflict and com-
mon interest, and predicts what players should
do (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). Although there
were earlier contributions, modern approaches to
game theory are usually attributed to Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1947). Following this
work, John Nash, who is probably best known
for his work on non-cooperative (1951) and coop-
erative solutions (1953), expanded the field sub-
stantially (he won the Nobel Prize for his work
in 1994). These games are structured around
players, the constraints they face, the informa-
tion they possess, and the outcomes they expect
given their set of possible actions. These players
are assumed to be rational and able to predict
outcomes based on their own and their fellow
players’ actions (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).
We choose a game theoretic model as our
method of analysis as game theory allows us
to accurately capture the issues faced in fish-
eries management. We proceed to briefly cover
the history of the application of game theory to
the fisheries industry, before assessing three key
models that we could use to analyse the West
Coast rock lobster fishery.
3.1 A history of the application of
game theory to the fisheries indus-
try
One of the most enduring and pervasive theo-
ries of common-pool resources is H. Scott Gor-
don’s (1954), Anthony Scott’s (1955) and Garret
Hardin’s (1968) collective work on developing a
bio-economic model of common-pool resources.
At its foundation, this model argues that any
open access conditions of a fishery would lead to
the economic destruction of stocks. This is es-
sentially because the cost of catching an extra
fish is shared between all fishers in terms of the
productivity of the resource in future, whereas
the benefit accrues only to that fisher. Each
fisher then has the incentive to overfish, lead-
ing to the decline and eventual destruction of
the resource. Hardin (1968) uses the metaphor
of a grassy common shared by many herdsman
and argues as follows.
“[Given the incentives] the rational
herdsman concludes that the only sen-
sible course for him to pursue is to
add another animal to his herd. And
another... But this is the conclusion
reached by each and every rational
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein
is the tragedy. Each man is locked into
a system that compels him to increase
his herd without limit - in a world that
is limited. Ruin is the destination to-
ward which all men rush, each pursuing
his own best interest...”
Given this, policies designed to avert the de-
struction of common-pool resources should in-
clude external intervention. This is most often
a strong central government armed with knowl-
edge, monitoring abilities, and the power to ef-
fectively control access to the resource. We will
discuss the applicability of this model to our
analysis in the following section.
The first paper to apply game theoretic meth-
ods to an analysis of the fishery industry itself
(rather than common-pool resources as in the
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model above) was Munro (1979). In this pa-
per he argues that the issue of managing trans-
boundary fishery stocks, those stocks that are
not within only one country’s Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ), would require a joint ap-
proach by all parties and therefore applies the
theory of bargaining, or cooperative games, to
the problem. In cooperative games players are
able to form binding commitments, such as those
that are legally enforceable. In non-cooperative
games this is assumed be impossible, and hence
any cooperation must be self-enforcing (Mas-
Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995).
Munro (1979) investigated how asymmetry in
players in terms of discount rates, cost of fishing,
and consumer preferences, can impact the catch
shares of the players. In this analysis he sim-
plified the game to include only two players - an
approach that many game theorists take. One of
the conclusions of Munro’s (1979) work is that
the joint management of a resource where play-
ers are asymmetric is greatly simplified by the
existence of side payments (essentially transfers
of money between players).
One year after Munro first used game theory
in the context of fisheries management, Levhari
and Mirman (1980) published their influential
paper on “fish wars”. In their analysis they high-
light two important features of fisheries manage-
ment that allow a game theoretic analysis to be
useful: first, each player must take into account
the other players actions, and second, the under-
lying stock is affected by both players’ decisions
(Sumaila, 1999). This is similar to the game
theoretic notion of “strategic interdependence”
where each agent recognises that the outcome of
the game in terms of profits or utility depends
not only on that agents’ actions, but also the ac-
tions of other players in the game (Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green, 1995).
Also in 1980, Clark (1980) wrote a game
theoretic paper exploring restricted access to
common-property resources such as fisheries.
For the first time, it was shown that for a lim-
ited entry system with at least two players, the
non-cooperative game results in overfishing.
Following these pioneering papers by Munro,
Levhari and Mirman, and Clark, many other
contributions were published, mostly in the
1990s, applying game theory to fisheries (for a
full review consult Bailey, Sumaila and Lindroos
(2010)). These games typically modelled fish-
eries shared between only two players. Although
there are multiple examples of fisheries being
shared by more than two groups, game theo-
rists reduce the complexity by aggregating actors
into two groups of similar players. For exam-
ple, Armstrong and Flaaten (1991) groups fishers
by gear-type in the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery,
while Sumaila (1995) models the interaction be-
tween offshore trawlers and coastal vessels. In
Munro’s (1979) paper he groups players by na-
tionality. Similarly, Kennedy (1987) groups fish-
ers into Australians and Japanese, both target-
ing Southern bluefin tuna. Here Kennedy (1987)
concluded that the optimal outcome is the joint
management of the resource and a cooperative
agreement between nations which resulted in the
total exclusion of the Australians from the fish-
ery, subject to compensation through side pay-
ments.
In a paper authored by Walker and Gard-
ner (1992), a general model of common-pool re-
sources is presented which is able to account for
the concept of safe yields. Here the usage of the
resource has direct impact on the stock of the
resource in ways typically seen in many natural
common-pool resources. For example, there are
specific usage rates at which the resource has a
zero probability of being depleted, and similarly,
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rates that imply the destruction of the resource
with a positive probability. This is particularly
pertinent for fisheries, given the natural ability of
this resource to replenish stocks over time, where
yields are within certain ranges.
In Rules, Games and Common-Pool Re-
sources, Ostrom et al. (1994) interrogate the
use of game theory in the context of common-
pool resources. They approach the issue of mod-
elling the strategic interaction between players
by using basic finitely repeated non-cooperative
games, within a broader institutional analysis
framework. Ostrom et al. (1994) further break
down the analysis by introducing an analytic
method that separates appropriation problems
from provision problems. In the context of fish-
eries, an appropriation problem relates to is-
sues of apportioning the benefits of that fish-
ery, whereas provision problems relate to issues
around maintaining the resource and avoiding
its destruction (Ostrom et al., 1994). It can
be understood that appropriation problems in-
volve the flow of the resource, while provision
problems relate to the stock of the resource.
Although most frequently, these problems are
nested as one problem, the separation of prob-
lems is specifically helpful in deep-sea fisheries
where there are issues related to more than just
the survival of the resource, such as the alloca-
tion of the resource between countries.
When Sumaila (1999) published a review of
the applications of game theory to fisheries in
1999, much of the work still focussed on the two-
player framework introduced by Munro (1979).
Subsequent to this, research focussed on exten-
sions of this model. In Sumaila (2002), the two-
player game was extended to study the efficiency
of marine protected areas, rather than simply the
catch shares between players. This paper de-
veloped a bio-economic model to assess the dif-
ferences in expected efficiency under cooperative
and non-cooperative management. Perhaps un-
surprisingly the paper concluded that both stock
biomass and rent from the fishery are higher un-
der cooperative management by the players.
While most studies have used a single-stage
structure, there have been notable examples
of multiple-stage or sequential games. In
sequential-play games players take turns mak-
ing decisions, and usually players are able to ob-
serve the actions of other players before making
their own decisions. Benchekroun and Van Long
(2002) model a transboundary fishery where one
player has a first-mover advantage. They find
that in general the sequential nature of the model
leads to a more conservationist approach being
adopted by parties. Sumaila (1995) develops a
two-stage game where players decide on the fish-
ing effort in stage one, and their optimal catch-
shares in stage two. Ruseski (1998) has players
choose the number of allowable firms in the fish-
ery in stage one, and then optimise their catch-
shares in the competitive second stage. Hannes-
son (1995) develops a sequential-play game to
consider the possibility of a cooperative solution
being self-enforcing, whereas Laukkanen (2003)
allows the catch of one agent to occur first be-
cause they target the feeding grounds, followed
by the other agent who targets the spawning
grounds. In this research Laukkanen (2003) also
models stochastic shocks in recruitment in the
fishery to show that these shocks endanger any
cooperative agreements if they are prevalent and
the actions of each fisher are not observable.
In Laukkanen (2001) the Northern Baltic
Salmon fishery is modelled using a dynamic
game theoretic model with four rounds. Here,
to accurately account for the dynamics of fishing
for salmon in this area, four fisheries harvest the
northernmost stocks in turn: first is the commer-
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cial offshore fishers, then the commercial inshore
fishers, followed by recreational fishers in rivers,
and finally recreational fishers in estuaries.
Kronbak and Lindroos (2006) develop the
most complex multi-stage game where in stage
one authorities choose their level of regulation, in
stage two they choose the level of effort and con-
trol, in stage three fishers choose their coalition
structure and in stage four fishers choose their
optimal effort. The authors do this to combine
the idea of coalition formation and the level of
regulation and enforcement in the industry.
As is evident, there has been considerable ap-
plication of game theory to the strategic inter-
action between stakeholders in many fisheries.
Given that there is much research to draw from,
in the next section we focus on three of the most
appropriate models discussed above, and adopt
one that is the most useful for our analysis of the
West Coast rock lobster fishery in the 1980s.
3.2 Choosing a game theoretic model
of analysis
Given this brief history of the application of
game theory to fisheries, we highlight three mod-
els that we can draw on to analyse the rock lob-
ster industry in the 1980s. Each of these is dis-
cussed in turn along with an explanation of why
the model should be used here or not, leading
us to the conclusion that the framework used by
Ostrom et al. (1994) is the most relevant for our
analysis.
3.2.1 Gordon, Scott, and Hardin’s bio-
economic model of common-pool
resources
As mentioned above, one of the most com-
mon models of common-pool resources is Gordon
(1954), Scott (1955) and Hardin’s (1968) collec-
tive work on developing a bio-economic model of
common-pool resources. While this model has
been used numerous times in the past, and es-
pecially in the early application of game theory
to common-pool resources, we choose not to use
it in our analysis for four reasons. First, there
are many problems that common-pool resources
face, not only overuse as predicted by the bio-
economic model.
Second, in hundreds of documented cases ap-
propriators have cooperatively designed arrange-
ments that limited and coordinated their use of
natural resources (see Schlager, 1990, 2002, and
Ostrom, 1990, for a discussion of these). This
outcome is precluded by the bio-economic model
of common-pool resources.
Third, the model predicts that communica-
tion between resource users has no significant
result on the outcomes predicted. Many empiri-
cal studies have shown this to be false (Ostrom,
Gardner and Walker, 1994).
Fourth, in many respects common-pool re-
source situations are much more complex than
the bio-economic model predicts. Individuals are
not always single-mindedly trapped in their own
tragedies, nor are government regulators always
omniscient and omnipotent. Rather there are
complex and strategic interactions between re-
source users, regulators and the common-pool
resource itself.
While this model can be quite insightful for
understanding the basic issue faced in most
common-pool resources, it has been discredited
in recent times most notably by Elinor Ostrom
and Edella Schlager. As Schlager (2002) strongly
advises, “the bio-economic model does not cap-
ture critical dimensions of common-pool resource
dilemmas, or human behaviour, and is therefore
inappropriately used in all circumstances.”
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3.2.2 Walker and Gardner’s model of
the probabilistic destruction of
common-pool resources
Walker and Gardner (1992) use a non-
cooperative game theoretic model to introduce
the concept of a safe yield into the game, which
models the regenerative process of renewable re-
sources such as fisheries. As mentioned above,
this is a key model for us given its ability to
account for issues commonly encountered in the
fisheries industry.
In this model the authors use the theory of
N -person finitely repeated games. Each player
i has an endowment of resources ei which can
be invested in the common-pool resource, or in-
vested in a safe, outside activity. The payoff to
each appropriator from investing in the resource
depends on the aggregate investment made by
all players.
Using this model they test the expected out-
comes as predicted by game theory using a lab-
oratory experiment. Their primary results are
first, that where the safe zone is a single point,
the resource is rapidly destroyed in accordance
with the predicted outcome, and second, where
the safe zone is an interval group, behaviour fo-
cuses on the best available equilibrium for the
group in some cases, but in general this cannot
be sustained and the resource is destroyed.
While this study has merit, it is not applicable
to this research for two reasons. First, the model
is not able to take into account changes in the
rules of the game, or, more importantly for our
purposes, expected changes in the rules of the
game. Secondly, this model does not take into
account the various options or strategies open to
the regulators of the resource. For our use we
require that regulators are given the option to
roll over quotas to the same finite set of quota
holders, or choose not to roll over quotas and
allocate the quotas to a new set of fishers. For
these two practical reasons we must rule out this
model as a potential method of analysis.
3.2.3 Ostrom’s method of game theoretic
analysis
Ostrom et al. (1994) present a method of
analysing common-pool resources using game
theory, and offer empirical and laboratory tests
of these models.
As with much of the work conducted by
Ostrom, Rules, Games and Common-Pool Re-
sources uses an Institutional Analysis and De-
velopment framework as a tool of organising the
work. They present a method of using non-
cooperative game theory as a formal language
for applying this framework to common-pool re-
sources.
We will use the basic game theory framework
introduced by Ostrom and her colleagues here
for three key reasons. First, as we will see the
mindset of the fishers in the 1980s was an impor-
tant part of why they acted the way they did.
The method of using basic game theory along
with expected preferences of players introduced
in Ostrom et al. (1994) is perfectly able to incor-
porate this detail. Models offered by Walker and
Gardner (1992) however are made increasingly
unmanageable by this. Second, this method can
effectively account for the ability of the regula-
tors to choose between strategies, whereas other
models assume that regulators are outside the
realm of the game. Third, the model is logical,
malleable and is supported by empirical and lab-
oratory testing (Ostrom et al., 1994).
In this research they address common-pool re-
source problems as N -person, non-cooperative
games. They then conduct empirical and lab-
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oratory tests to determine the validity of the re-
sults predicted by the games. We follow their
approach of using a basic game theoretic model
as the fundamental platform of analysis, tweak-
ing it to suit our needs by limiting the players to
two (rather than N ).
In our analysis we will follow the lead of Os-
trom et al. (1994) by using the concept of a
Nash equilibrium to predict the outcome of that
strategic interaction. Informally, a Nash equi-
librum can be understood to be an equilibrium
in which no player has the incentive to deviate
from his chosen strategy (Dixit, Skeath and Rei-
ley, 1999).
3.3 An analysis of the rock lobster
fishery in the 1980s
Following this methodology, we characterize the
industry in terms of simple game theory. In this
respect we move from the broad accounts pre-
sented above to understanding at a much finer
level of detail the dynamics that existed in the
1980s.
During this period of time, the industry en-
compassed three major actors; the quota-holding
companies, the industry regulators, and those
excluded from holding quotas. We will make a
simplification and group the two processor com-
panies and the 40 or so quota holders together for
convenience as “companies”. Similarly, we will
group the Quota Board and the Interim Quota
Board, as discussed in detail later, as “regula-
tors”. When we concentrate our focus on the in-
teraction between these three actors we uncover
an interesting, and possibly collusive, alliance
between companies and the regulators, and some
key incentives too.
During this period there existed a strong
degree of cooperation between regulators and
the companies. Individual relationships be-
tween the fisheries management authority and
the companies were strengthened by the fact
that they shared a common culture in terms
of educational background, language and value
systems (Mayekiso, Tilney and Swardt, 2000).
The homogeneity between regulators and the
quota-holding companies created a spirit of co-
operation, engendering a high degree of co-
management with respect to stock assessment
and management procedures.
There also existed a focus, in the minds of the
companies, on the long term sustainability of the
resource. This is in part due to the de facto
long term nature of the property rights issued
by the Quota Board and also simply because the
demise of the fishery would lead to the demise
of the industry. More importantly however, the
confidence the industry had in the Quota Board
in its implicit agreement to grant rights to a se-
lect group of individuals would plausibly have
affected the degree of cooperation between these
actors. The repetitive reallocation of rights, year
after year, to a privileged few companies would
have generated at least a quasi-collusive relation-
ship between them. The companies therefore
had the expectation that the regulators would
continue to roll over the quota allocations so long
as they did not overfish to any great extent. In
terms of incentives then, the companies had an
incentive to behave in accordance with the reg-
ulators’ wishes, so long as they had the expec-
tation that regulators could roll over the quotas
annually. Figure 8 highlights the continuity of
this relationship.
The excluded fishers however, were not in-
volved in this industry to any great extent (Peter
Foley, Chief Executive, West Coast Rock Lob-
ster Association, personal communication, May
20, 2011). In order to ensure the exclusion of
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Figure 8: The relationship between company
expectations and the rolling over of quotas
Source: Author’s construction.
these actors some degree of monitoring and en-
forcement was necessary, a task made easier by
the structure of the value chain. In terms of this
structure, quota holders were required to trans-
fer their produce directly to one of the two pro-
cessors, who would then process, package and
sell the items either to the export market or to
the local market. Regulators would then simply
monitor the export market through customs at
any port, and monitor the local market by check-
ing invoices at restaurants. Exports would have
to be conducted under the auspices of one of the
two processors, otherwise the export would sim-
ply be denied. Local restaurants would also need
to prove that their stock came from one of the
two processors in terms of an invoice.
Monitoring and enforcement was focussed at
two points and hence it was much easier to quell
the parallel black market for lobster. In game
theoretic parlance, the regulators had perfect
and complete information (Binmore, 1992). By
this we mean that all players are fully aware
of the strategies available to all players and the
payoffs associated with these (complete informa-
tion), and also that players are able to see all of
the moves made in the game (perfect informa-
tion). These assumptions are plausible because
firstly, both players know the strategies available
to each other at any point in the game. Secondly,
regulators had a high degree of certainty around
whether fishers were complying with the regula-
tions or not.
In contrast, today there are 19 processing
plants with over 2,800 employees, making efforts
to monitor the industry much more challenging.
Enforcement is now focussed mainly on landing
sites. The sheer number of these sites, and the
fact that many small craft do not need proper
landing sites make it all the more difficult. In
the early 1990s the law was amended in terms of
which quota holders had access to a number of
feasible processors and marketers (Mather et al.,
2003). The creation of this diversified market
for lobster presented more opportunities to ex-
port through illegal means.
Note also that during the 1980s excluded fish-
ers were predominantly coloured or African, and
faced large obstacles in getting quotas for them-
selves. Although the regulations of the day did
not explicitly exclude Africans or coloureds from
attracting quotas, the quasi-collusive relation-
ship between the largely white-owned compa-
nies and the regulators would have impeded the
chance of successfully receiving a quota (Mather
et al., 2003, Daniels, 2007, Diemont et al., 1986).
The industry was therefore dominated by two
actors, the companies and the regulators. We
can summarize the strategic interaction of these
players in formal game theory, as shown in figure
9. We can ignore the excluded fishers for the
time being since any strategy they choose to play
has minimal effect on the payoff of other players.
There are some notable nuances in the game
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Figure 9: Generic strategic interaction between














Note: Companies payoffs are listed first, regula-
tors payoffs are listed second.
Source: Author’s construction.
presented that are worthy of our discussion.
First, we have assumed a sequential game where
companies first choose whether to abide by the
regulations or overexploit the resource in terms
of size and yield restrictions. Subsequently, the
regulators choose whether to roll over the quotas
to existing companies, hence playing Roll Over
(RO), or to not roll over quotas, hence playing
Not Roll Over (NRO), and allocate quotas to
new or other existing quota holders. Second, we
have assumed perfect and complete information,
and as mentioned earlier we are confident that
these assumptions are plausible.
Using some basic assumptions we can hypoth-
esize the rank order of certain payoffs and hence
predict the outcomes of this strategic interac-
tion. Beginning with the more benign assump-
tions, we postulate that if companies choose to
abide by the rules then the regulators would pre-
fer to roll over the quotas to those responsible
firms. Confronted by overexploitation, the regu-
lators would be reluctant to renew the rights of
culpable quota holders. From this we know that
Σ > Π, and Ω > Ψ.
In terms of ranking the payoffs attributable to
companies, we know that companies will always
prefer regulators to roll over quotas, rather than
not rolling quotas, and hence α > β, and γ > δ.
In order to specify the final preference rela-
tion we should note that we have assumed that
this is a game of complete information and hence
players are fully aware of the strategies available
to all players and the associated payoffs (Bin-
more, 1992). Because of this, companies are able
to use backward induction to predict what reg-
ulators are likely to do at future decision points
(Aumann, 1995). Hence, companies know that
if they choose to abide by regulations, regula-
tors will choose to roll over the quotas. Con-
versely, if companies choose to overexploit the
resource, the regulators will choose to not roll
over the quotas (as mentioned above, we know
that Σ > Π, and Ω > Ψ). Companies there-
fore choose between getting α if they abide by
regulations or δ if they do not.
In order to determine the ranking of these pay-
offs we can assess the likely gains of choosing to
overexploit the resource, in comparison to the
benefits of abiding by the regulations. Mather
et al. (2002) present evidence to conclude that
quota holders during this period did not in fact
have much excess capacity to overfish. For ex-
ample, in 1992 the total harvesting capacity of
the commercial West Coast rock lobster fleet was
roughly 2,414 tons, while the TAC attributable
to commercial fishers was set at 2,176 tons that
season. Hence, we hypothesize that choosing to
overexploit the resource as much as possible and
not have quotas rolled over would not have been
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preferred to fishing legally and having the quotas
rolled over. Given the data presented by Mather
et al. (2002) we are confident that companies pre-
fer to fish legally and have quotas rolled over, and
hence α > δ.
Let us now walk through the preference rela-
tions to determine the equilibrium of this inter-
action. We present figure 10 below for conve-
nience.
Figure 10: Generic strategic interaction between














Note: Companies payoffs are listed first, regula-
tors payoffs are listed second.
Source: Author’s construction.
To determine this equilibrium we should assess
what each player is likely to do at each decision
point in the game. If the game were to reach
the decision point labeled “2. Regulators”, reg-
ulators would prefer to roll over quotas to com-
panies since they have abided by the regulations
and have proven themselves trustworthy. Simi-
larly, were the game to reach the decision point
labeled “3. Regulators”, regulators would pre-
fer to not roll over quotas as the companies have
chosen to overexploit the fishery. Knowing the
decisions that regulators are likely to make at
these decision points, companies know that they
must choose between receiving a payoff of α were
they to abide by the regulations, and δ were they
not to. As above, we postulate that α > δ and
as such companies will choose to play abide at
the first decision point. The moves each player
is expected to play at each decision node is em-
boldened and italicised in figure 10 to show the
equilibrium.
This equilibrium can be written as ((Abide),
(Roll over quotas if companies play abide, Not
roll over quotas if companies play overexploit)),
with the payoffs being (α, Σ). Here we have used
the method of backward induction to solve for
this solution, and hence the equilibrium accords
with a refinement introduced by Selten (1975)
called a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This
equilibrium qualifies as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium because the behaviour of the play-
ers, as defined in the equilibrium, represents a
Nash equilibrium in all subgames of the full game
(Dixit, Skeath and Reiley, 1999). Hence each
player makes optimal decisions at every decision
point.
In formulating this model we have hypothe-
sized various preference relations. What we have
yet to discuss is the plausibility of our model in
terms of the information each actor possessed at
the time. We should be comforted by the fact
that the game is relatively simple for agents to
understand, is repeated many times over, and
involves large stakes. In conditions such as this,
our assumption that agents know their possible
strategies, their opponent’s strategies, various
preference relations and payoffs, should be satis-
fied (Camerer et al., 1993, McCabe, Rassenti and
Smith, 1996, Aumann, 1981, Hechter, 1990).
In terms of explaining the industry in the
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1980s, the model tends to do very well. It not
only substantiates why the same 40 companies
received quotas each year, but also why the re-
source was so stable over this period.
A noteworthy feature of the model is that it
is fairly robust in the sense that regulators have
the ability to punish the companies. For exam-
ple, if the companies overexploited the resource
the regulators can punish them by excluding
these companies from receiving quotas. Given
this we would expect the companies to abide by
the rules, and the regulators to roll the quotas
over to the same set of companies. As discussed
previously, this prediction is upheld in the data.
The model also then predicts that there existed
a high degree of co-management of the resource
and hence stable or even increasing yields. In-
deed the data do show that the resource was pos-
sibly the most stable it has been since commer-
cial exploitation began (figure 3).
The ability of regulators to punish compa-
nies gives the equilibrium a degree of robustness,
however the model also highlights the pivotal
role expectations play in engendering coopera-
tion between companies and regulators. It is be-
cause companies expect regulators to roll over
the quotas so long as they abide by regulations
that this outcome exists in the first place. In-
deed the achilles heel of this equilibrium takes
the form of these expectations, for if they were
to break down this self-fulfilling prophecy would
fail to exist.
So far we have analyzed at a very micro level
the actors in the industry, the strategies of the
actors, expectations they have, their preferences
and information they likely hold. We have used
this to create a game theoretic model of the
strategic interaction between players and have
found that the model fits the period fairly well
in terms of explaining the outcomes seen. In the
next section of this research we test the model
by assessing whether it can be used to explain
the outcomes observed in the period subsequent
to the 1980s.
3.4 The interregnum period
The 1980s and the 1990s were vastly different
decades in South Africa’s lobster fishery. In the
1980s, the right to access marine living resources
were held tightly in the hands of a few individu-
als, with little recognition of the rights of other
potential fishers. At least since the democratiza-
tion of South Africa in 1994 an expectation pro-
liferated among many previously excluded stake-
holders that the country’s new democratic prin-
ciples would manifest in a series of new fish-
ing policies (Daniels, 2007). Indeed an array of
policies to include the newly recognized stake-
holders would emerge in the late 1990s. These
policies would however take many years to be
drafted, discussed, debated, modified, re-drafted
and eventually promulgated. During the mid-
1990s then, the industry was caught in a state of
flux while new policies were being created, po-
tentially affecting the incentives of actors in the
industry. We begin this section by attempting
to profile the salient features of the interregnum
landscape. We then move on to review our ear-
lier model to test its ability to explain the out-
comes witnessed in the post-1980s period.
South African regulators had two - often op-
posing - challenges in terms of the creation of a
new fisheries policy. First, fisheries needed to be
managed effectively in a such a way to ensure
the sustainability of the resource. Second they
needed to solve the quandary of how to deal with
the vestiges of apartheid (Cockcroft and Payne,
1999). The raised expectations that the democ-
ratization of the country brought, coupled with
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the multifarious array of challenges faced within
the rock lobster fishery, made for a demanding
environment in which to set regulations.
The process of formulating these new, more
equitable policies was initiated by the Minister
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in Oc-
tober 1994. In the following years the newly
mooted Fisheries Policy Development Commit-
tee drafted a Green Paper and a White paper,
culminating in a presentation to the Minister in
1997 (Anonymous, 1997).
Following this, further consultation took place
with the various stakeholders interested in the
fishing industry, including communities. The
regulators, being the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Environmental Affairs, took great
pride in hearing all those who felt they had some-
thing to contribute. Ultimately, the White Pa-
per of 1997 and these consultations concluded
with the Marine Living Resources Act, which
was promulgated in September 1998. The new
Act differed greatly from the old Act by giving
the Minister more power, and by abolishing the
Quota Board. In light of the need for cooperative
governance and stakeholder buy-in, more repre-
sentative advisory and consultative bodies were
created and the challenge put to the organiza-
tion administering the Act to ensure that these
bodies could immediately act the way that they
were designed. These organizations included the
Fisheries Transformation Council, the Chief Di-
rectorate of Sea Fisheries, and the Sea Fisheries
Research Institute.
This new fisheries policy had at its heart three
central pillars of sustainability, equity and the
stability of the industry (Cockcroft and Payne,
1999). In terms of the sustainability of resources,
stock assessments indicate that the rock lobster
fishery was under extreme pressure during this
period - the TAC of roughly 4,000 tons per an-
num in the 1980s was steadily decreased to as low
as 1,520 tons per annum in 1995/96 (Johnston
and Butterworth, 2005). According to the De-
partment of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
(2005) this decline was the result of “large and
unsustainable catches taken during the first half
of the 20th century.” Anecdotal evidence con-
firms that the resource was the victim of over-
fishing on a massive scale during that period
(Tony Leiman, Associate Professor, UCT, per-
sonal communication, April 29, 2011, Susan Hol-
loway, Senior Research Officer, UCT Marine Re-
source Assessment and Management Group, per-
sonal communication, April 6, 2011).
Figure 11: Number of West Coast rock lobster
quota holders between 1990 and 2002
Source: Fishing Industry Handbook (1992-
2002).
The number of individuals holding quotas in-
creased markedly over this period. As can be
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seen from figure 11, in 1990 49 predominantly
white rights-holders controlled the West Coast
rock lobster TAC. In contrast, by the end of 2003
over 1,000 rights had been allocated to nearly
200 individuals, with around 70% of these rights
being allocated to previously excluded fishers
(DEAT, 2005). To accommodate this rapid in-
crease in the number of quotas issued, the av-
erage allocation per quota correspondingly de-
creased; average allocations decreased from 56
tons in 1992 to 7 tons per quota in 2002.
Not only were quotas spread more evenly
across the fishing community, they were also allo-
cated in a more equitable fashion. As discussed
previously, in the 1980s the overwhelming ma-
jority of quotas were held by a select group of
white individuals. By 2001 however, roughly 70
percent of rights were allocated to previously dis-
advantaged race groups (DEAT, 2005). The du-
ration of these quotas was significantly length-
ened from the original 1 year to a period of 10
years in order to facilitate the stability of the
industry and to encourage fixed investment.
In terms of the current fisheries policy due re-
gard is given to those previously disadvantaged
race groups, as well as women. Other quota al-
location criteria include compliance with legisla-
tion on skills development, corporate social in-
vestment, local economic development, the abil-
ity to add value through processing and whether
the applicant relies to a large degree on income
derived from the West Coast rock lobster fishery.
In the early 1990s the processing and mar-
keting of rock lobster was freed up entirely.
Nowadays quota holders have an array of po-
tential marketers and processors to choose from,
rather than the original (Hobson’s) choice be-
tween SAFROC and CLEA. The large increase
in the number of quota holders, as well as the
opening of the market has substantially changed
the value chain. As figure 12 shows the market
is far less concentrated, especially in the process-
ing and marketing segment with 19 firms in the
1990s, compared with just 2 firms in the 1980s.
As previously discussed, this has made moni-
toring and controlling the industry substantially
more difficult.
Figure 12: West Coast rock lobster value chain
in the 1990s
Source: Author’s construction.
Now that we have characterized the interreg-
num period, we turn our attention towards the
model we created in the previous section and as-
sess its ability to explain the outcomes witnessed
in the 1990s.
In terms of the model presented earlier the
regulators had the option to roll over the quo-
tas to the same set of 40 companies or not. The
regulators, in the form of the Quota Board, had
some degree of discretion over who was to re-
ceive quotas, and who was to be excluded. Over
time an expectation formed in the minds of the
companies that the Board would continually roll
over quotas so long as the companies chose not
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to overexploit the resource. This created what
we have called de facto long term fishing rights,
and incentivized the fishing companies to abide
by the regulations leading to the sustainable
exploitation of the resource seen in the 1980s.
These expectations and de facto long term fish-
ing rights were at the core of this equilibrium.
As mentioned above, in the mid-1990s the
Quota Board was replaced with a more regu-
lated body. Although there were allegations of
corrupt allocation procedures, in general the new
so-called Interim Quota Board had much less dis-
cretion over who received quotas (Daniels, 2007).
Thus, in the 1990s the regulators had only one
strategy, and that was to allocate quotas as dic-
tated by policy.
When we first created the model above we
made the assumption that the excluded fishers
had practically no influence on the payoffs of the
regulators and the companies. In the context of
the 1990s this assumption is not valid, given the
focus of policy on an equitable distribution of
quotas to all stakeholders, and especially to the
previously excluded race groups. These players
must now enter our model as actors in the game
since the decisions they make influence the pay-
offs of other players. Conversely, the regulators
no longer have more than one strategy and hence
can be excluded from the game. Given this we
present our model once more, with updated play-
ers, payoffs and strategies in figure 13.
As before, we group new quota holders as one
player in this game, and name them “new fish-
ers” for convenience.
It is worth explaining in some detail the
assumptions this new structure encompasses.
First, we have dropped our previous assump-
tion of perfect information, as indicated by the
information set between nodes two and three.
Formally, an information set drawn between a
Figure 13: Generic strategic interaction between














Note: Companies payoffs are listed first, new
fishers payoffs are listed second.
Source: Author’s construction.
player’s decision nodes restricts the ability of
that player to know which specific node he is at
(Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). This
manifests because that player was not able to
observe what had previously transpired in the
game. We do this because it is entirely logical
that companies would have to move in ignorance
of what the new fishers would do, and similarly,
new fishers would need to move in ignorance of
what the companies have done. This contrasts
with the 1980s where regulators had a strong
idea of whether companies were abiding by the
regulations or not.
Second, although we have specified the game
in the form of a game tree (an extensive form
game), the lack of information players have re-
garding the moves made by each other means
that the new fishers must make their choice with-
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out knowing what strategy the companies have
played.
Again, we can assume certain preference re-
lations, given the interaction these players are
engaged in. Regardless of whether the com-
panies choose to abide by the rules or overex-
ploit the resource, a new quota holder would
prefer to overexploit the resource. This is be-
cause the benefit the player receives from over-
exploiting the resource is allocated squarely on
that person, whereas the cost of that action is
distributed across all players, in terms of lower
future yields. We are confident in this for three
reasons: first, the ability of regulators to detect
overfishing has been dramatically reduced com-
pared to the 1980s, and secondly the lack of in-
formation between companies and fishers plau-
sibly leads to a situation where both of them
suspect that the other is overfishing. Third, the
quota length was changed from one year to 10
years. This reduced the focus on attracting quo-
tas each year, since the default expectation was
that the quotas would last a decade as long as
regulators did not catch them conducting any
illegal fishing practices.
Because of this we will expect that the new
quota holders prefer to overexploit the resource,
regardless of what the companies do (∆ > Γ,
and Φ > Λ). Similarly, the companies have an
incentive to overexploit the resource since the
payoff from overexploiting is attracted wholly
to each company, whereas the cost, in terms of
lower future yields, is spread across all players
(γ > α, and δ > β). The outcome predicted
in this strategic interaction is for companies to
choose to overexploit the resource, and for new
fishers to do the same. This is represented by the
Nash equilibrium of (Overexploit, Overexploit),
yielding payoffs of (δ, Λ).
This is a classic tragedy of the commons
dilemma, as first noted by Hardin in 1968.3 As
with the commons, each quota holder concludes
that he should catch more fish as the cost of do-
ing so is shared by all fishers, whilst the benefits
are apportioned only to the fisher that catches
more. The preferred strategy of each player is
to opt for personal gain over restraint, leading
to the overexploitation of the resource. This has
clear implications for the management of the re-
source, which we will discuss later.
We have seen that the decade prior to trans-
formation was characterized by a comfortable
relationship between regulators and the indus-
try, leading to a high degree of cooperation and
co-management of the resource. Unfortunately
however, the interregnum period was not char-
acterized by the same degree of co-management.
When regulators lost the discretion to allocate
quotas to a select few companies, the existing
equilibrium was disturbed. When we use our
model to evaluate the 1990s we find that the
game has changed significantly. The previously
excluded fishers now have a significant role to
play, whereas the once pivotal role regulators
played has been reduced entirely. An assessment
of the incentives of those players in the game re-
veals that the game takes for the form of a clas-
sic tragedy of the commons dilemma, in which
each player prefers overexploitation to restraint.
Indeed, this is evident from the yield of the re-
source during this period - while the 1980s were
particularly stable, the 1990s shows a sharp de-
cline in yields. Before we discuss the implications
of this finding however, we present a selection of
potential confounds to the above model to deter-
mine the robustness of our specification.
3The sole difference here is that we are dealing with
two players, whereas Hardin (1968) used a metaphor in-
volving numerous players.
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3.5 Possible confounds to this expla-
nation
There are possible confounds that potentially
complicate our analysis above. Here we present a
description of two of the most supported, along
with reasons why we will discard these claims.
The two main confounds are the reduced growth
rates experienced during the early 1990s, and the
increased incidence of large lobster mortalities.
While these issues do not alter the structure of
the interaction, they offer potential reasons for
why yields declined so markedly in the 1990s.
Were these hypotheses to be true, they would
complicate our model, which predicts that the
decline of the resource was primarily due to over-
exploitation.
Figure 14: Annual growth rate of a 70mm male
West Coast rock lobster between 1968 and 2001
Source: Author’s construction, Johnston and
Butterworth (2005).
In 1989 the growth rate of West Coast rock
lobsters dropped substantially (figure 14). Cara-
pace growth of at least 4mm per year had
been common up until 1990, however subsequent
growth rates were closer to 2mm in most re-
gions, and even negative in some (Cockcroft and
Goosen, 1995). It is still not fully understood
why this occurred, however the widespread na-
ture of the growth reduction is indicative of a
large-scale environmental cause, possibly linked
to the El Niño phenomenon (Pollock and Cock-
croft, 1997). Others have hypothesized that the
strict adherence to the 89mm CL restriction re-
sulted in genetic selection for slow growth (OR-
LAC, 1989, Tony Leiman, Associate Professor,
UCT, personal communication, April 29, 2011).
In terms of this hypothesis only the fastest grow-
ing lobster would be extracted, causing the pro-
portion of slow growing lobster in the population
to increase over time. The CL restriction may
have also caused a large proportion of undersized
lobsters to be caught accidentally, and perhaps
injured before being returned to sea, retarding
their future growth rates (ORLAC, 1989).
Over and above the slow somatic growth rates
experienced in the 1990s, lobster mortalities in
the form of “walkouts” were experienced on a
massive scale (Cockcroft et al., 2000). Decay
of unusually intense phytoplankton blooms rob
the ocean of vital oxygen, causing lobsters to
move into very shallow regions near the shore.
During spring tides these lobster may become
stranded in the shallows when the tide recedes,
where they die in hot sunlight (Peschak, 2005).
Approximately 60 tons of lobster washed ashore
during one event in 1994 and some 2,000 tons
were stranded in another event in 1997 - the
worst mortality ever recorded in South Africa
(Matthews and Pitcher, 1996, Cockcroft, 2001).
As mentioned above, if these hypotheses are
true they complicate the predictions made by
our model, specifically that the decline in the
resource was primarily due to overexploitation,
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not environmental factors. There are however
some reasons why the confounds presented above
may not be valid. To assess the validity of the
reasons given for the decline in somatic growth
rates first, we must note that El Niño is a long
term cyclical climate pattern (Trenberth et al.,
2007). It would then not make sense for this
to have such a significant effect on growth rates
in the early 1990s, but not at any other point in
time. Another fact we should consider is that the
El Niño phenomenon was significantly stronger
during 1988 and 1989, than the previous few
years (Pastor, 2006). If the El Niño hypothesis
were true we would expect stable growth rates
leading up to 1989, and a large decline in that
year, but this is not the case. As can be seen
from figure 14, the decline in the growth rates
began as far back as the early 1970s.
In fact what figure 14 shows is a prolonged
decline in growth rates between roughly 1970
and 1990, and a stabilization from then onwards.
Compare this to figure 15 which shows a decline
in the TAC from 1990 onwards, indicative of a
decline in the resource over that period. It would
seem then that the two phenomena are not cor-
related very well over time.
Turning our attention to the mass stranding
hypothesis, we note that a small stranding oc-
curred in 1994 and the largest stranding occurred
in 1997. Once again the decline in yields be-
gins in 1990 and predates the occurrence of mass
strandings by some years. We therefore conclude
that the above two confounds are not well sup-
ported by the data.
Given this, we return to our earlier postula-
tion that the overfishing was the most impor-
tant factor leading to the decline of the resource.
Although data on illegally harvested rock lob-
ster is obviously very difficult to capture, there
is much anecdotal evidence to support our hy-
Figure 15: Total allowable catch of the West
Coast rock lobster between 1982 and 2001
Source: Author’s construction, Melville-Smith
and Van Sittert (2005).
pothesis that mass overfishing existed during the
1990s. In a landmark case held in the United
States (US), a South African lobster exporter
and a US importer were found guilty of ille-
gally harvesting roughly US$55 million worth of
lobster in South Africa between 1987 and 2001
(Hlongwane, 2011). The accused were found
guilty of poaching two different species of lob-
ster, underreporting catches to fisheries authori-
ties, bribing South African fisheries inspectors,
and harvesting lobster way in excess of legal
quotas. The court was told that between 1999
and 2001 93 percent of all lobster processed by
the accused were illegally poached, and that be-
tween 1987 and 2001, the company illegally har-
vested nearly 800 tons of South Coast rock lob-
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ster alone (Anonymous, 2008). More recently,
it is estimated that illegal poaching of West
Coast rock lobster increased by roughly 54.4 per-
cent per annum between 2008 and 2011 (Susan
Holloway, Senior Research Officer, UCT Marine
Resource Assessment and Management Group,
personal communication, April 6, 2011). The
model predicts that the decline in the resource
was driven chiefly by overexploitation, some-
thing that seems to be upheld quite well empir-
ically.
Given that the confounds presented above are
not validated by the data, we can conclude that
the decline in the resource was likely because of
overexploitation rather than environmental fac-
tors. Our model therefore, seems to correctly
account for the resource’s decline in the 1990s.
In the next section we move on to discuss the
implications our model provides for the effective
management of the resource.
4 Implications for policymak-
ers
As discussed previously, the model we have built
shows that the fishery currently takes the form
of a classic tragedy of the commons dilemma in
which players in the game each have the incen-
tive to overexploit the resource. This differs dra-
matically from the 1980s period in which fishers
had the incentive to maintain the fishery. Given
the current structure of the fishery, and the in-
centives of each player in the game, if the fishery
was left unregulated the resource would likely be
depleted over time. In order to avoid this out-
come, policymakers would be served by being
cognisant of the dilemma they face and also of
the potential solutions to this dilemma. While it
is not the task of this research to propose a full
alternative fisheries policy, in the fourth section
of this research we will provide a discussion of the
policy implications of our analysis, highlighting
specific case studies from fisheries in other parts
of the world, the lessons we can learn from these,
and ending off with a note on the key impacts
this research should have on policy development
going forward.
4.1 How to solve the current tragedy
of the commons dilemma in the
West Coast rock lobster fishery
We can define the West Coast rock lobster fish-
ery as a classic common-pool resource. Firstly,
exclusion of beneficiaries through physical or in-
stitutional means is especially costly, and sec-
ondly, exploitation by one user reduces the re-
source availability for others (Ostrom et al.,
1999). These two characteristics create the po-
tential for the tragedy of the commons dilemma
to exist, in which individuals follow their own
short term interests to produce outcomes that
are not in anyone’s long term interest.
Two primary solutions are available (Hardin,
1978). The first is the privatization of the re-
source. Ostensibly, this serves to protect the re-
source and moderate its use, however this often
ignores pre-existing management and has been
shown to sometimes result in worse outcomes
than under the previous management regime
(Ostrom et al., 1999). Further, this necessarily
involves a degree of measurement and control,
which in common-pool resources such as fisheries
may be prohibitively expensive.
An alternative solution, often associated with
Arthur C. Pigou, is to let the government own
the resource and levy an extraction tax. Pigou
(1920) showed that under certain circumstances
the taxes charged will be identical to the price
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charged in an efficient market. Ostrom et al.
(1999) argue that this solution ignores the orig-
inal owners or users of the resource and often
results in a group of disenfranchised, often in-
digenous, individuals. The logic of a Pigouvian
solution has also been questioned by others, most
notably by Coase (1960), who argues that the so-
lution works so well only because the real prob-
lems are assumed away. In assuming that the
costs of monitoring and gathering information
are negligible, the solution is made theoretically
perfect, but flawed in practice. Again, in the
context of fisheries management the cost of mon-
itoring cannot be assumed to be negligible.
A third solution, previously discarded by most
economists, is to retain the resource as common
property and let users create their own system
of governance (Ostrom and Williamson, 2009).
In her book entitled Governing the Commons:
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Ac-
tion (1990), Ostrom argues against the belief
that the existence of a common property re-
source necessarily implies a tragedy of the com-
mons “dilemma” which requires privatisation or
government intervention to solve. After a sum-
mary of available evidence on the management
of common-pool resources she finds that “users
themselves envisage rules and enforcement mech-
anisms that enable them to sustain tolerable out-
comes.” By contrast, she argues that govern-
mentally imposed restrictions are often counter-
productive because they either lack legitimacy
or the requisite knowledge to manage effectively.
In later work she highlights two cases of this:
overgrazing in Inner Asia, as documented by
Sneath (1998), and inadequate modern irriga-
tion in Nepal, as documented by Lam (1998), as
well as a selection of other more minor failures of
governments to manage common-pool resources
effectively (Ostrom and Williamson, 2009).
To summarize succinctly her findings from
many decades of work on this dilemma, she of-
fers a set of eight design principles which have
been found to exist in many stable common-pool
resource management regimes.
We present these principles, as outlined in her
book, with a brief discussion of each.
1. Well-defined boundaries exist: Boundaries
between legitimate users and nonusers, as well
as of the resource itself, must be clearly defined.
2. Rules regarding the appropriation and
provision of common-pool resources are adapted
to local conditions: Ostrom (1990, 1999) is very
clear that no single set of rules work efficiently,
fairly, and sustainably in relation to all common-
pool resources. Rules should be adapted in
some way to local conditions, to account for,
amongst others, spacial heterogeneity, culture,
ideologies and customs.
3. Collective-choice arrangements allow
most resource appropriators to participate in
the decision-making process: Ostrom (1990)
states that “most individuals affected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying
the operational rules.”
4. Effective monitoring by monitors who are
part of, or accountable to, the appropriators:
Monitoring of this kind makes those who do
not comply with rules visible to the community,
which facilitates the effectiveness of rule en-
forcement mechanisms. Further, since monitors
themselves benefit from improved resource
conditions, the incentives are more aligned.
5. There is a scale of graduated sanctions for
resource appropriators who violate community
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rules: This serves to deter participants from
excessive violations of community rules, but also
to maintain social cohesion in that there is a
proportionality between severity of the sanction
and the violation.
6. Mechanisms of conflict resolution are
cheap and of easy access: In order to credibly
manage disputes, conflict resolution mechanisms
must be rapidly accessible, and low-cost conflict
resolution mechanisms are more likely to be
sustainable and utilizable.
7. The self-determination of the community is
recognized by higher-level authorities: External
government agencies do not challenge the right
of local users to create their own institutions.
Government may aid the local users to create
and enforce these institutions, but do not
impose rules and regulations that undermine
local efforts.
8. In the case of larger common-pool re-
sources, organization takes the form of multiple
layers of nested enterprises: Appropriation,
provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict res-
olution and governance activities are organized
in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
It is worthwhile noting that the current fish-
eries policy contravenes Ostrom’s design princi-
ples in many respects. For example, although
legitimate users and nonusers can be defined
by whether they hold a quota or not, it is not
clear that those without quotas should remain
excluded from the allocations. Guidelines for
medium- and large-scale companies are quite
clear, however there does not exist the same de-
gree of clarity at other levels in the industry. For
example, it is very difficult for regulators to de-
termine which subsistence fishers should have a
right to fish, and which should not. The Min-
ister realized this first hand when a public out-
cry followed the 2005 allocations (Daniels, 2007).
He subsequently doubled allocations that year
to placate many bona fide fishers who were ex-
cluded in the first instance.
Further, monitoring is not done by those who
are part of or accountable to the fishers. Mon-
itoring falls within the ambit of Marine and
Coastal Management and is conducted by poorly
paid individuals with little incentive to actively
prevent poaching (Peter Foley, Chief Executive,
West Coast Rock Lobster Association, personal
communication, May 20, 2011).
While this research does not intend to pro-
pose a full set of solutions to the problems faced
in the West Coast rock lobster fishery, the model
used herein implies that policymakers might be
served by being cognizant of the tragedy of the
commons dilemma and the solutions available.
In this section we have highlighted the current
thinking around potential solutions, with a spe-
cial focus on the work of Elinor Ostrom.
We now move to present two case studies of
experiences in New Zealand. Not only is New
Zealand the paragon of devolved fisheries man-
agement regimes, but it is also a country which
faces many of the same challenges South Africa
faces in terms of groups of disenfranchised fish-
ers, and high-value and easily accessible fisheries
like the rock lobster. As we will see fishery man-
agement in New Zealand displays many of Os-
trom’s design principles, and has seen a resur-
gence in the stocks of many key resources in the
last decade.
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4.2 Deep-sea crabs in New Zealand
This case study of the deep-sea crab fishery in
New Zealand reveals that this industry currently
displays a very similar industry structure as the
West Coast rock lobster fishery in the 1980s, and
serves to affirm our previous analysis. It further
allows us to understand the environment that
needs to exist for us to return to the structure
of the industry in the 1980s.
This fishery is characterised by landings
of king crab (including, Neolithodes brodiei,
Lithodes murrayi, and L. longispinus), red
crabs (Chaceon bicolor), and giant spider crabs
(Jacquinotia edwardsii) (Naylor, Webber and
Booth, 2005). King crabs and red crabs tend
to be found in a similar habitat in moderate
to deep waters off the northern island of New
Zealand. Spider crabs live at depths from inter-
tidal to 550 meters, and are predominantly found
in the southern New Zealand waters.
In 1986, 27 species were introduced into
the New Zealand Quota Management System
(QMS), a system used to manage commercial
fishery harvests on the basis of individual trans-
ferable quotas (ITQ) (Townsend and Shotton,
2008). The QMS implementation gained trac-
tion in 2001 when many new species were intro-
duced into the QMS as a part of the 1996 Fish-
eries Act full implementation (Craig and Soboil,
2008). By 2003 there were over 60 species in
the QMS, and today there are over 100 species
managed within this framework.
At the beginning of each fishing year,
quota owners receive“annual catch entitlements”
(ACE), which provide them with authorization
to catch an amount of fish equal to their respec-
tive share of the TAC. The QMS developed into
a hybrid system which employs both quantity (in
terms of the ACE), and price instruments (here
known as “deemed values”). Deemed values are
civil penalties paid to the state for landing fish
in excess of your ACE (Newell, 2004).
In the past, initial quota allocations for a QMS
species were made to fishers on the basis of the
historical harvests of fish by that fisher. When
the historical catches resulted in allocations less
than the commercial catch limit the remaining
quota went to the state. The New Zealand Min-
istry of Fisheries sold this remaining quota by an
open public tender.
In 2004, it was deemed that quotas for all fu-
ture species introduced into the QMS was, with
some limited exceptions, subject to a tender pro-
cess rather than by allocation according to his-
torical catches. For Maori, the indigenous group
of the population of New Zealand, the Treaty
of Waitangi ensured twenty percent of all new
quota species, and ten percent of all species allo-
cated prior to 2004, would be purchased by the
state and made available to the local Maori in-
habitants.
The change from catch history allocation to
public tender avoided a ‘race for catch history’
in fisheries that were soon to become involved in
the QMS. The Ministry of Fisheries also insti-
tuted a moratorium on new non-QMS permits
for this reason (Craig and Soboil, 2008).
This fishery is noteworthy because of the de-
velopment of a governance framework to focus on
collective objectives throughout the entire value
chain, from harvesting, processing, and market-
ing to fisheries management. This section exam-
ines the gains from the cooperative management,
collective action and self-governance by rights
holders, and is particularly pertinent for us given
the structure of the West Coast rock lobster in-
dustry in the 1980s as explored earlier in this
research.
In 2006, deep-sea crab in waters surround-
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ing New Zealand were brought into the QMS
through open tender. All quotas were allocated
to the highest bidder through tender, and based
on the 2004 amendments to the Fisheries Act
there were no allocations based on catch history.
Four New Zealand entities acquired 90% of the
deep-sea crab quota, and facilitated the develop-
ment of “Crabco” - an institution with the goal
of maximising the long-term productivity of the
stock and to add to quota value by, among other
things, determining if the biological character-
istics of the species could sustain higher yields
(Townsend and Shotton, 2008).
When the rights were first tendered to the
public, the TAC was set at a very conserva-
tive level, reflecting the limited knowledge about
the biological characteristics of this resource.
Crabco could enhance robust scientific research
and supply accurate fine scale catch and land-
ing reporting, which would ultimately have the
effect of increasing the TAC, and therefore par-
ticipants’ quota holdings. Crabco began harvest-
ing king and red crabs in May of 2007, using a
harvest plan geared to collect data that would
help estimate abundance and spacial distribu-
tion across the various catchment areas.
This type of active involvement in policy-
making is inherent to the deep-sea crab quota
owners as many of them had been involved in
other quota species and their policy develop-
ment. They learned from these previous encoun-
ters that without a devolved fishery management
process, unnecessary economic costs and sub-
optimal fishing rules would be imposed (Craig
and Soboil, 2008). These deep-sea crab fishers
seem to have known the economic benefits of
good fisheries management, and the importance
to review and monitor TACs, and other fishing
rules for improved resource management.
In order to derive these economic benefits,
the deep-sea crab fishers developed the Crabco
model. Much in the way Scott (1955) first pro-
posed, it was based on the premise of a sole
owner, where quota owners entrusted the man-
agement of their rights to the company specifi-
cally geared towards maximising their quota val-
ues. In terms of this arrangement, at the begin-
ning of each year quota holders transferred their
ACE to the company. The company was then
responsible for delivering the following:
• Strategic plans, which were signed off by
shareholders prior to implementation,
• Internal and external communications, in-
cluding liaising with the Ministry of Fish-
eries,
• Planning and management of harvesting
and processing,
• Provision of marketing services, and
• Quality assurance in operational delivery.
In every way Crabco acts as a unified com-
pany. It aims to maximise the profit of its share-
holders throughout the value chain in terms of ef-
ficient harvesting methods and processing meth-
ods, as well as through effective marketing. The
company returns its profits back to shareholders
through a transparent accounting process. Ro-
bust and thorough analysis is given to all share-
holders and all profits are distributed to quota
owners as specified in their ACE transfer agree-
ments (Craig and Soboil, 2008).
Profits are calculated for each species and are
roughly equal to the total revenue from the sale
of that species, less all costs incurred to make
those sales. These costs would likely include the
cost of harvesting, processing, marketing, and
the general management costs. Profits are then
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divided among the members in proportion to
their share of the ACE that each owner trans-
ferred to Crabco at the beginning of that year.
Quota holders have signalled their intention to
protect the resource by making a commitment
to a two-year development phase for each new
quota holder. In terms of this, any profits gen-
erated during those first two years are to assist
in the further development of the fishery.
Voting rights in Crabco are proportional to
the value of the ACE sold by that quota holder
to Crabco in the previous year. If, for example,
a certain shareholder received 19% of Crabco’s
profits last year in accordance with the ACE he
sold to the company at the beginning of that
year, he will be entitled to 19% of the voting
rights in this year.
With the establishment of Crabco, the mem-
bers began developing a management plan for
the deep-sea crab fishery. The company acts as a
representative of all deep-sea crab fishers and in
addition to providing the research support men-
tioned earlier, liaises with government entities on
a regular basis with a view to being actively in-
volved in the management of the fishery. This
clearly shows how Crabco does not only harvest
the resource, but also accepts management and
development responsibilities.
As Hønneland (1999) predicts, when resource
users are involved in rule-making and manage-
ment activities compliance levels improved dra-
matically. With stakeholders now actively in-
volved in policy decisions, the industry has taken
ownership of difficult decisions. Specifically,
quota holders have agreed to use only crab pots,
rather than trawling, as a way of avoiding the
environmental impacts of that kind of fishing
method. Crabco members have also agreed to
increase deemed values, which will deter free rid-
ers from entering the industry and help manage
bycatch in the scampi fishery.
The original tender of quotas in new and de-
veloping fisheries created a perfect opportunity
for self management. For deep-sea crabs, the de-
velopment of Crabco has created more respon-
sive, efficient, and targeted management deci-
sions that benefits the rights holders and the
fishery as a whole.
Overall, this model of self-management of the
deep-sea crab resource has yielded accurate sci-
entific reports, increasing TACs, full extraction
of rents along the value chain, and a resource
that is seemingly guaranteed to be protected well
into the future.
As discussed in an earlier chapter of this re-
search, the West Coast rock lobster industry in
the 1980s had a very similar structure to this.
Although some differences exist, specifically in
terms of harvesting and processing the resource,
the unified single-firm approach originally en-
visioned by Scott (1955) has once again been
shown to be successful in developing successful,
industry-supported management policies. These
policies are made with the best possible infor-
mation, and have high rates of compliance as
predicted by Ostrom (1990).
Unfortunately, this has little impact on South
Africa fishery policy going forward. A necessary
condition for this type of industry structure is
that the quotas are held by a small number of
like-minded fishers - in the New Zealand case
only 4 entities, and in the South African case
only around 40 entities. Given the current state
of the industry structure, with over 200 quota
holders, it is unlikely that this method of creat-
ing a single firm to harvest, process, market and
guard the resource will be able to be created. De-
spite this, the case study presented here further
underscores our analysis of the 1980s as being
correct.
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4.3 Rock lobster in New Zealand
In this section we cover the rock lobster fishery
in New Zealand, which has developed a system of
governance over decades that meet many of Os-
trom’s design principles, and is widely regarded
to be one of the most successful instances of
common-pool resource management. This serves
as a case study for South African fisheries poli-
cymakers, and should have direct impact on how
policy is modified going forward.
Rock lobster has a long history of exploitation
in New Zealand. The Maori, who arrived on the
islands somewhere between the 10th and 14th
centuries, consider rock lobster to not only be
historically significant, but culturally significant
too (Annala, 1983).
Two species are indigenous to this region, Ja-
sus edwardsii and Jasus verreauxi . These rock
lobster are harvested primarily with lobster pots
boats with one or two crew members. These lob-
ster are largely caught to be exported live to
Asian markets (although some are sold frozen
to the United States) and is the fourth largest
export species in New Zealand (StatsNZ, 2013).
Recent fishery stock assessments define the re-
source as stable or recovering from a previous
period of over-fishing, although large degrees of
uncertainty still remain due to incomplete infor-
mation on recreational catches and the degree of
illegal fishing (NRLMG, 2002).
Boom and bust cycles characterise much of
the history of the rock lobster fishery in New
Zealand. In a similar fashion to the rock lobster
fishery in South Africa, a sharp run up in yields
in the 1940s and 1950s was experienced during
this time, with minor peaks and valleys evident
in catch and catch per unit effort.
In this case study we will focus on the most
common species, Jasus edwardsii, which is di-
vided into nine geographical regions along the
coast of New Zealand (as shown in figure 16).
These regions correspond with regional rock lob-
ster industry organizations or “Crayfish Manage-
ment Advisory Committees”, commonly called
CRAMACs, which are key to lobster manage-
ment in New Zealand.
Figure 16: New Zealand rock lobster manage-
ment areas, and geographical distribution of
CRAMACs
Source: National Rock Lobster Management
Group, 2005.
“Policy Statements for the Rock Lobster Con-
trolled Fishery” introduced the fishery to “con-
trolled fishery” status in 1980 (Annala, 1983).
As a controlled fishery, rock lobster permits were
distributed by the Fishing Licensing Authority
(FLA), in terms of which permits were given to
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fishers with a long-term commitment to the fish-
ing industry and earned at least 80% of their
income from fishing. Note that this was from
fishing generally, not from lobster fishing only.
As Annala (1983) records, in that year the num-
ber of commercial rock lobster fishing permits
dropped by 38%.
These permits correspond to one of the nine
geographically distinct fishing regions mentioned
above. The Fishing Industry Board (FIB) orga-
nized a liaison committee for each region consist-
ing of fishers and processors who provided input
into fishery management. A national level liaison
committee consisting of a representative from
each region was also created. The formation of
these national, and more micro-level committees
was a critical step towards co-management of the
resource - a topic we will soon investigate.
While these reforms continued in the rock lob-
ster fishery, the broader New Zealand fishing in-
dustry went through a period of fundamental
changes. In 1986, New Zealand became one of
the first countries to adopt market-based regu-
lation when it initiated the QMS as discussed in
the previous case study (Crothers, 1988).
Although rock lobster was not included in the
first stage of the QMS rollout, it, along with paua
(abalone), were first to be put forward as pilot
fisheries. As Yandle (2008) describes, the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) orig-
inally approached the New Zealand Federation
of Commercial Fishermen in the early 1980s and
sought to use paua and rock lobster as pilot fish-
eries for the introduction of ITQ management.
The Federation considered this, but rejected the
proposal because the two fisheries appeared to
be healthy at that time, and the Federation was
concerned about a system which involved set-
ting a total allowable catch, thereby limiting the
resource they could extract each fishing season.
Despite this, the QMS was eventually introduced
in the fin fisheries first.
As the rock lobster looked to be under more
pressure, the issue of bringing rock lobster into
the QMS was reexamined by stakeholders (Bran-
son, 2005, as cited by Yandle, 2006). Discussion
first took place at the national level between the
National Rock Lobster Liaison Committee and
the FIB (Duncan, 1985). Both the Liaison Com-
mittee and the FIB prepared their own briefs
to aid discussions (MAF, 1986) and after two
rounds of discussions two options were left on the
table - institue ITQs under the QMS, or keep the
existing controlled fishery policy with the addi-
tion of TACs. On 16 April 1987 the votes fell
in favour of introducing the fishery to the QMS
(Yandle, 2008).
Originally the rock lobster was intended to be
added to the QMS in 1988, however the Treaty
of Waitangi effectively pushed this change into
1990 (Moon, 1999). In the end the 1989 Maori
Fisheries Act brought the rock lobster into the
QMS in the 1990 fishing year.
In accordance with standard QMS protocols,
the total allowable catch of this fishery was
reduced in 1989. The exact reduction differs
per region, however the most significant decline
was said to be experienced in the Southern re-
gion which dropped their TAC by 35.1% (MAF,
1990).
Immediately subsequent to this change the
fishery experienced turbulence in terms of both
setting the TAC and also a series of national and
regional initiatives on approaches to maintaining
or improving the fishery. These events developed
a micro-level involvement of the committees and
promoted an environment of co-management be-
tween government and industry.
Apart for holding discussions around the set-
ting of the TAC, industry also participated in
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the broader consultative process around man-
agement. The Rock Lobster Steering Committee
was convened by the Minister of Agriculture and
Fisheries in 1991 to develop a management plan
in consultation with industry. This was com-
posed of commercial fishers, recreational fishers,
Maori stakeholders, and conservationists. Point-
edly, the MAF saw this as a “shift towards a new
management approach based on the direct in-
volvement of user interests in the formulation of
a forward-looking fishery plan” (Yandle, 2008).
The final plan recommended that instead of fo-
cussing on a national plan using TAC reduc-
tions as its main tool, the strategy should fo-
cus on regionally tailored efforts such a cracking
down on illegal fishing, handling protocols, and
changes in size restrictions. Finally the plan rec-
ommended that a National Rock Lobster Man-
agement Group (NRLMG) be created to advise
the minister on the management of the fishery.
Since this time, the industry continues to en-
gage with the government in developing various
initiatives to stabilise or increase the stock of
rock lobster. These include,
• Supplemental Enforcement Initiative: In
1993 the MAF and the FIB contracted ad-
ditional enforcement to target illegal fishing
in both the commercial and non-commercial
sector. This was paid for out of an addi-
tional levy of commercial rock lobster fish-
ers.
• Data Gathering Programmes: Collecting
data on the stock of rock lobster is an impor-
tant part of the management process. The
industry has actively and progressively de-
veloped monitoring initiatives such as keep-
ing logbooks and facilitating tag and release
programmes.
• No Tag/No Sale: A problem with many
rock lobster fisheries is illegally caught pro-
duce reaching the retail and hospitality in-
dustries. The rock lobster fishers, in con-
junction with FIB, introduced a programme
to identify legally caught lobster with spe-
cial tags.
• A Tailored, Regional Harvest Strategy: In
the early 1990s stocks in one particular
region, CRA3, were in significant decline.
Commercial, recreational, and traditional
Maori fishers formed the CRA3 Users Group
to develop a tailored harvest strategy to
deal with the regions decline. While these
users were concerned with the sustainability
of the resource, the day-to-day livelihoods
of many fishers depended on lobster yields.
For this reason a strategy with two funda-
mental goals was drafted: first, to reduce
catches in order to prevent to collapse of
the resource, and second, to increase the
landed value per lobster in order to com-
pensate for the reduction in yields. The key
initiatives introduced by this group were:
eliminating half of the TAC for three years,
closure of the CRA3 fishery for three months
to all fishers, movement of the open season
to Winter when prices are higher, increased
enforcement targeted towards poachers, and
decreasing the minimum catch size of males.
The reduction of minimum catch size was
not without controversy, however the Min-
istry of Fisheries evaluated this proposal us-
ing an acknowledged mathematical model
and eventually accepted the strategy. The
outcome of this has been a marked increase
in the stock of the resource, along with in-
creased catch rates of larger lobster. The
creation of this harvest strategy has been
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highlighted as a key moment in generating
momentum for co-management of the fish-
ery in New Zealand. Not only were the fish-
ers able to use their superior knowledge of
the fishery to accurately identify the true
problems faced, but they were also given
the space to create innovative and tailored
responses to these problems. For a full dis-
cussion see “A fisheries management success
story: the Gisborne, New Zealand, fishery
for red rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii)” by
Breen and Kendrick (1997).
While not all of these initiatives were success-
ful they did demonstrate how actively involved
in resource management the lobster industry be-
came during this period. The 1990s goes down
as a key period of time in which rock lobster
stakeholders at both the national and regional
level espoused management of the resource as
a key part of their roles. As this momentum
continued, stakeholders agreed on the develop-
ment of the New Zealand Rock Lobster Indus-
try Committee (NZ RLIC) and its relationship
to the regional CRAMACs. According to Yandle
(2008) this became finalised in 1999 when legisla-
tion was passed that allowed government to del-
egate certain fisheries management responsibil-
ities to Commercial Stakeholder Organisations,
which provided the space for industry to grow in
this role.
In terms of the NZ RLIC formation, this body
would be an umbrella organisation composed of
the regional CRAMACs. As mentioned earlier,
the geographic boundaries of these CRAMACs
are based on the regional quota management
areas for species Jasus edwardsii. While exact
membership rules vary in each CRAMAC, the
aim is for each CRAMAC to attract quota hold-
ers, permit holders, processors, exporters and
all other stakeholders. Each CRAMAC appoints
one executive to the NZ RLIC and contributes
to the national organizational budget in propor-
tion to the TAC granted in that region. The NZ
RLIC, as a national body, represents the indus-
try in engagements with government, MAF, and
FIB.
In 1997 another key step in the evolution
of this management framework occurred when
stock assessment research contracts became indi-
vidually contestable. The NZ RLIC, in conjunc-
tion with the newly formed New Zealand Seafood
Industry Council (SeaFIC) fisheries scientists as
well as the traditional provider, contested and
won a one-year contract based on the concept
of industry involvement (Yandle, 2006). Today
the NZ RLIC consistently wins multi-year stock
assessment research contracts.
Since the QMS and the later developments
of devolved governance were introduced, catch
levels have been reduced through TAC reduc-
tions, while catch per unit effort (CPUE) has in-
creased (figure 17). Scientific stock assessments
conducted recently appear consistent with the
theory that the stocks are being safely managed,
subject to the usual degree of uncertainty around
recreational and illegal harvests.
However, the effect of these developments on
the management process is more directly observ-
able; there is clear evidence of increased stake-
holder participation in the fishery management
process. The NZ RLIC acts not only as a re-
source harvester, but also an advocate, a re-
searcher, and a coordinator of activities for re-
gional CRAMACs.
As Ostrom (1990, 1994) records and
Vyrastekova and van Soest (2003) test em-
pirically, the involvement of stakeholders in the
research and rule-making process increases the
likelihood that those rules will be followed and
33
Figure 17: New Zealand rock lobster (Jasus ed-
wardsii) annual catch and catch per unit effort
Source: Yandle, 2006.
thus the robustness of self-management regimes
are improved.
The development of devolved governance in
the rock lobster industry in New Zealand was
a multi-decade process. The emergence of NZ
RLIC and CRAMACs involved both social cap-
ital and management experience within the in-
dustry and an expansion of property rights. Ac-
cording to Yandle (2003, 2006) the continuation
of this approach throughout New Zealand’s fish-
eries suggests that property rights and social
capital development are key requirements for the
successful development of devolved governance.
There are multiple lessons for South African
fisheries policymakers from the analysis under-
gone earlier, as well as these two case studies.
This will be discussed in the next section.
4.4 Conclusions and implications of
this research for South African
fisheries policymakers
This research began by assessing the history of
the West Coast rock lobster in South Africa to
find that the 1980s period stands in stark con-
trast with the general decline of the fishery. An
in-depth analysis of the stakeholders involved in
the game during this period allows us to con-
clude that it was the industry structure that
lead chiefly to the stability in yields. Organi-
zations such as SAFROC and CLEA acted to-
gether not only as harvesters and processors of
this resource, but also as managers, much in the
same way as Crabco did in New Zealand in the
last decade.
An analysis of the current industry however,
reveals that this industry structure no longer ex-
ists. A game theoretic analysis reveals that the
fishery currently represents a classic tragedy of
the commons in which stakeholders follow their
own short-term interests and in doing so over-
fish to the point where the fishery is likely to be
depleted.
Traditional economic thinking would suggest
that we have two options to deal with this
tragedy; privatisation or government ownership.
These have in recent times been classified as ar-
chaic and out-dated, especially given high costs
of monitoring fisheries and their likelihood to ig-
nore the rights of indigenous fishers.
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom has been the
chief proponent of a third option; devolved gov-
ernance of common-pool resources. We have
used a case study of the rock lobster fishery in
New Zealand to explore potential ways this type
of co-management of the resource has been es-
tablished in practice.
With all of this in mind, this research nat-
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urally brings to the light the following policy
suggestions.
1. Zones A and B, as well as the four
sub-areas 5-9, as shown in figure 6 should be
the boundaries for six regional committees of
rock lobster stakeholders, who each report to
a national committee of rock lobster represen-
tatives. The success of the regional system of
CRAMACs, with a national-level NZ RLIC
is clear from the rock lobster fishery in New
Zealand. More importantly this will enable
many of the following interventions to occur
successfully.
2. We should facilitate collective choice
arrangements which allow local stakeholders to
participate in the management process. This
would allow committees to determine rules that
meet the challenges faced in that specific region.
For example, in certain regions along the North-
ern section of the coastline poaching is openly
practiced and rife among certain population
groups. Those who drive along the road running
parallel to the ocean are likely to see many
cases of illegal rock lobster being sold openly
along the roadside. This differs completely from
the challenges faced in other regions. Using
this local knowledge of the resource will aid
policymaking and also engender a link between
regulators and resource appropriators.
3. Regulators should recognize, within certain
limits, the ability of regional committees to
develop initiatives that meet the challenges faced
in that region. As discussed above, different
regions along the South African coastline suffer
from different challenges. Creating regional
committees is only worthwhile if government
allows them the space to develop and implement
targeted initiatives. The CRA3 tailored harvest
strategy in New Zealand is one example of how
when local committees espouse management of
the resource, regionally defined rules can have
great impacts on the resource.
4. Committees have cheap, easy methods of
resolving conflicts, with graduated sanctions for
those who violate rules. By devolving conflict
resolution to the regional level and by empower-
ing them to sanction violators, we empower the
appropriators of the resource with monitoring
powers. This has been proven to increase
compliance in common-pool resources, and en-
gender a kind of visible respect for the resource.
Typical sanctions could include having quotas
removed, banning further quota applications,
fines, among other options. These sanctions
should be escalated to the national level, and
potentially to the regulators themselves before
being actioned, as a check against abuse at the
regional level.
It is important to realise that regulators can-
not force stakeholders to accept their role in the
management of the resource, however this kind
of co-management of resources has been shown
to be effective in many cases around the world.
While the system of CRAMACs and the NZ
RLIC took decades to develop organically, with
this end in mind, and with a correct understand-
ing of what type of dilemma the fishery currently
faces, policymakers can begin the path to devel-
oping this kind of devolved governance system.
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